Suchergebnisse

The article offers a survey of some of the ideas of Karl Marx in the context of the subsequent development of the new institutional economic theory in the 20th - early 21st centuries. It discusses various aspects of the unity of the historical and the logical in Marx's Capital in the light of various ways of combining the historical and the theoretical in economic research, including a new economic history. The article considers the issues of the linkages between the problems of import and transplantation of institutes and the export of production relations, as well as the interaction of institutes and technologies, but in the context of the contradiction between productive forces and production relations, and possible parallels between the initial ideas of transaction costs and costs of circulation in the second volume of Marx's Capital. It discusses the fundamental question of the absolute law of capital accumulation in the context of two key aspects of institutes - coordination and distribution.

This study reveals incentives for process innovations and their effects related to different conditions of creation process and the provision of an access to the results of intellectual activity for companies in the absence of antitrust restrictions and unfair competition. The model of the process innovation is designed for competition à la Cournot for N firms. Conclusions on the effect of process innovations on changes in prices, volumes, consumer surplus and industry profit are presented. A numerical example is employed to identify cost thresholds for innovations and conditions for voluntary licensing. It is shown that the total effects of innovations are higher than the effects related to the returns of technological leader. This indicates not only the problem of probable underinvestment but also demonstrates transaction cost arising form the process innovation. Technology competition and cooperation cases for three initially symmetric firms are discussed.

The article describes a framework conception of regional competitiveness. The notion of regional competitiveness as well as approaches to the classification of competi-tiveness factors are considered in detail. The author elaborates a set of indicators of re-gional competitiveness. The article also dis-cusses three groups of factors which can influence the competitiveness of any region.

This article aims at explaining the clustering of economic activity using instruments of new institutional economics, taking into account well-known descriptive characteristics of the cluster, as well as recent developments in research on hybrid institutional agreements, primarily, the research conducted by Michael Porter, Claude Ménard and others.

This article continues the discussion about the results and prospects of applying the institutional approach to the study of economic development, which was initiated by R. Kapeliushnikov (Voprosy Ekonomiki, 2019, No. 7—8). The focus is on the balance of interests and ideas in the light of economic growth, the question of the existence and protection of property rights in various social orders, taking into account the role of the state, the characteristics of institutions in the light of the problem of efficient resource usage, the refraction of the theory of social orders through the prism of objects left outside of the study by North, Wallis and Weingast, on the one hand, and Acemoglu and Robinson, on the other hand. An assessment of the adequacy of the conclusions regarding the pan-institutional nature of the North et al.'s approach is presented, as well as directions for the development of research in the context of a new institutional economic theory.

The article discusses the foundations, opportunities and limitations of adjusting the conceptual framework of institutional analysis by replacing the pair "institutional environment — institutional agreements" with the triad "macro-, meso- and micro-institutions". This study focuses on meso-institutions. It is expected that this concept is possible to fill the gap between the general institutional framework of economic exchange agents' interaction and their decisions, which are reflected in contracts. Some examples from the competition policy and institutional design are offered, particularly the regulatory impact assessment methodology, to illustrate the role and place of meso-institutions in the structuring of public relations.

Criminal prosecution of monopolistic activities in the form of market cartelization is the most sensitive instrument for individuals and can both have a serious deterrent effect and restrict behavior that is beneficial to the public welfare. The paper considers theoretical and economic aspects of choosing an antitrust enforcement regime in view of the projected changes in the discussion and application of the norms of article 178 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation, taking into account possible differences between organizing a cartel, entering into a cartel agreement and participating in a cartel. It is obvious that there are various options for correlating the concept of concluding an agreement and participating in it, including anti-competitive. However, it requires realistic assumptions about human behavior. Based on the principle of methodological individualism and the concept of bounded rationality used in economic sciences, the authors demonstrate restrictions on projecting the ratio of agreement conclusion/participation of legal entities (economic entities) on actions of individuals. Practical issues of designing criminal punishment for cartels are considered taking into account various legal concepts, including the form and types of guilt, as well as on the basis of comparison with other articles of the Criminal Code providing punishment for collective unlawful acts. In connection with the reproduction of the tradition of hostility in antitrust legislation, the Russian antimonopoly legislation has identified the risks of objective imputation (risks of type I errors) and insufficient punishment of the cartel organizer (risks of type II errors) in case of underestimation of the weight of economic concepts based on the principle of methodological individualism and the assumption of bounded rationality of individuals.

In many cases of competition law enforcement counterfeit goods are not included within the product-market boundaries on an equal basis with the original product. However, existing literature highlights that illegal copies should be included in market boundaries, since from the consumer's viewpoint counterfeit is a substitute of an original good. In this article, we determine the conditions under which counterfeit products should be included either in market shares of original producers or when counterfeit manufacturers should be recognized as right holder competitors. We conclude that in case of strong network effects counterfeit product should be included in the market share of the right holder. On the contrary, when network effects are weak, pirates or counterfeit manufacturers should be considered as competitors of original product producers.